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The adventures of praxis in Italy, from their outset to their 
denouement, are convoluted indeed. In order to see this, we must 
retrace, at least in outline, the genealogical path by which both the 
modern concept of praxis and the filosofia della prassi came to be estab-
lished and developed . In Italy, as I hope to make clear, the history of 
praxis must be traced along a way of several turns. 
The publication of Marx's Thesen ii.ber Feuerbach is the event that 
founds-if indirectly-Italy's filosofia della prassi. The Theses are brief, 
somewhat cryptic, and do not lend themselves to exact paraphrase. 
For now it is enough to mention that their overall purpose is to criti-
cize the shortcomings of Feuerbach' s materialism, particularly in 
regard to its failure to conceive of thought as a practical, as well as a 
critical, activity. Beyond this immediate concern, the Theses hint at an 
application of the mechanism of the Hegelian dialectic to a materialist 
foundation. The success of such an enterprise would remedy the 
defects of both materialism and Hegelian idealism. 
In the course of the eleven brief Theses, the term "praxis" comes 
up no less than seven times. This is not surprising, since it is this con-
cept, more than any other, that provides the center of gravity on which 
the Theses' theoretical substance balances. For Marx, praxis properly 
conceived, coupled with an accurate comprehension of praxis at work, 
could correct materialism's narrow focus on contemplation as the 
source of right knowledge about the world. Accordingly, the proper 
grasp of the constitution and role of praxis would correct what Marx 
saw as idealism's near-mystical adherence to the primacy of the theo-
retical. Thus in the First Thesis we see praxis presented as the antithe-
sis of the "theoretical attitude" ("das theoretische Verhalten"), or 
defined in terms of "human sensuous activity" ("menschliche 
sinnliche Tatigkeit"), or similarly, defined in the Fifth Thesis as "prac-
tical human-sensuous activity" ("praktische menschliche-sinnliche 
Tatigkeit"). 1 
The standard English translations of the Theses 2 render "praxis" 
as "practice," although this near-equivalence gives an incomplete 
sense of the meaning and connotations that the word actually carries. 
"Practice" denotes the executive, physical side of activity: the perfor-
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mance or application of appropriate movements on the one hand, or 
the repeated exercise that is essential to acquiring executive compe-
tence on the other. "Practice" does not necessarily signify human goal-
intending behavior-though "praxis" does . Thus it seems to me that 
the translation of "praxis" by "practice" restricts the horizon of intelli-
gibility within which the meaning of praxis actually functions. This is 
not to deny that practice does make up an aspect of human goal-
intending behavior . "Practice" might well describe the movements 
that are performed under the interpretive description of an appropri-
ate content state, for instance; or perhaps at a level accompanied by a 
less fully articulated (if any) content state, "practice" (or "practices") 
might signify those habitual competent behaviors performed 
"unthinkingly." 
Left unconnoted by the translation of praxis by "practice," how-
ever, is the cognitive dimension of praxis-as-purposive activity, which 
is to say that motivational or explanatory content in relation to which 
an agent intends activity. Yet such cognitive content is an essential 
dimension of the meaning of praxis. Praxis is not simply purposive, 
i.e., goal-directed, activity, but purposive activity the purpose of which 
is known to the actor under the description of an occurrent belief-
desire content. 3 To qualify as praxis, then, an action must be deter-
mined not only by the movements of which it is comprised, but by the 
way in which those movements, as well as the motivation for their 
having been undertaken, are present to the actor. This is what is meant 
by praxis, and for this reason I will leave the term untranslated. 
Marx, of course , was anything but the inventor of the term. We 
need go no further than the opening line of Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics to encounter a reference to praxis (I.i.1.).4 The original meaning 
of praxis encompasses such notions as action, fact, deed, business, and 
so forth: in general, practical activity. But as Aristotle uses it, praxis 
implies a kind of guiding knowledge, or cognitive self-presence, that is 
bound up with a specifically human consciousness and is not to be 
found in the behaviors and movements of, for instance, the non-
human animals. As an illustration of the specifically human, cognitive 
dimension of praxis, Aristotle states that sensation (aesthesis) alone 
cannot originate praxis since animals, presumably motivated by sensa-
tion, are not capable of praxis. 5 This is not to say that Aristotle's praxis 
performs the same theoretical function, and has the same conceptual 
makeup, as Marx's praxis. For although Marx's concept of praxis, like 
Aristotle's, is built around the notion of purposive, rational activity, 
Marx's concept, unlike Aristotle's, presupposes the direction and 
movement of the Hegelian dialectic. And this presupposition is only 
strengthened, not diminished, by the subsequent thinking of Italy's 
filosofia della prassi, as we will see. For all practical purposes, in fact, it 
would not be too much to say that the filosofia della prassi is the philos-
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Antonio Labriola was the first Italian to write of a filosofia della 
prassi in connection with Marx. 6 In his Discorrendo di socialismo e di 
filosofia,7 which appeared in 1898, Labriola stated that the core of 
Marx's historical materialism consisted in a philosophy of praxis. For 
Labriola, the defining problem of historical materialism therefore did 
not concern the formal aspects of Marxism, but rather consisted in 
apprehending things in which these forms are immanent. The result-
ing "new philosophy" 8-which is how Labriola referred to historical 
materialism-must therefore return thought to things, and beyond 
that, constitute itself as a philosophy that is itself immanent in things 
as a kind of "pensando in atto." 9 It is important to note, too, that 
Labriola was especially drawn to Engels's Anti-Diihring, specifically 
the thirteenth chapter entitled "Negation of the Negation." This chap-
ter, with its simultaneous critique and explication of the dialectical 
dynamic, sets out in a particularly elaborate manner the language and 
mechanics of the dialectical triad. 
With his own writings on dialectical philosophy, Giovanni 
Gentile continued to develop the line of thought Labriola had begun. 
In his study entitled filosofia della prassi10-which appeared very soon 
after Labriola's Discorrendo-Gentile declared his purpose to be the 
further articulation of historical materialism. 11 And in the same way 
that, as an appendix to his Discorrendo, Labriola had provided a trans-
lation of part of Chapter 13 of Engels's Anti-Diihring, Gentile infilosofia 
della prassi presented the first Italian translation of the Engels edition 
of the Feuerbach Theses. (We must remember that although Marx 
wrote these notes on Feuerbach in 1845, they did not appear publicly 
until Engels edited and published them, in 1888, as an appendix to his 
own Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen 
Philosophie.) 
In his introductory remarks to the Theses, Gentile quotes approv-
ingly Engels's assertion that although Marx had not originally intend-
ed them for publication, the eleven Theses contained "il germe geniale 
della nuova intuizione del mondo." 12 From this seed, Gentile intended 
to cultivate a new way of philosophizing which, consistent with the 
Feuerbach Theses themselves, would entail the synthesis of Hegelian 
dialectic with materialism. In terms of Gentile's model, it is worth not-
ing here that he, no less than Labriola, admired Engels's Anti-Diihring 
for its statement of the principles of historical materialism. 13 
Gramsci drew on the precedent provided by Labriola and 
Gentile when he began to formulate his own version of the filosofia 
della prassi. On the one side, he credited Labriola with having recog-
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nized Marxism as an independent, original philosophy. By virtue of 
this, according to Gramsci, Labriola avoided the errors of the neo-idea-
lists on one side, and the vulgar materialists on the other, 14 and in that 
regard, Gramsci resolved to continue to develop Labriola's position. 
On the other side, Gramsci, like Gentile, found the sources of the new 
philosophy in the Feuerbach Theses, which he thought restored to 
wholeness the two essential sides of philosophical life: materialism 
and the spirit. 15 As expressed in Marxism, Gramsci thought, this 
wholeness, or totality, would develop along with the auto-develop-
ment of social relations. 16 It is for this last reason that Gramsci defined 
the filosofia della prassi as the concretization and identification of phi-
losophy with the historical process. 17 
Two points are worth noting in regard to these formative mani-
festations of the filosofia della prassi. The first is the relative unortho-
doxy of the positions taken by Labriola, Gentile, and Gramsci. Perhaps 
it would be an anachronism to call the new filosofia della prassi revision-
ist, but that, in effect, is what it was. The second point provides the 
basis of the first, and concerns the de facto status of the filosofia della 
prassi as a philosophy pointing in the direction of a theory of interpre-
tation rather than in the direction of a theory of political action. 
In terms of the first point, Labriola' s attitude toward the sources 
of historical materialism is exemplary. For him, the writings of Marx 
and Engels-and particularly of Marx-did not constitute a canonical, 
or indeed even a finished, body of work. "Marx," said Labriola in Del 
materialismo storico, "fu incompleto." 18 Labriola's judgment was hardly 
his alone. When faced with an inquiry about the availability of his col-
lected works, Marx himself is supposed to have answered that they 
had yet to be written. 19 It is no wonder that for Labriola, and for his 
immediate successors in the Italian philosophical tradition that he 
helped establish, Marx's philosophy was not a ready-made, received 
corpus, but rather a series of fragments and suggestions in need of 
assembly, development, and expansion. Thus Labriola not only held 
the opinion that Marx was incomplete, but that he had not given ade-
quate expression to the tendency he epitomized. In a telling footnote 
to Discorrendo, Labriola felt compelled to respond to criticisms that he 
was either too much or not enough of a follower of Marx. Labriola 
simply replied that he accepted historical materialism, and tried to 
develop it as the present state of science would allow.20 Besides, as we 
have seen, Labriola was just as likely to turn to Chapter 13 of Engels' s 
Anti-Diihring for the proper interpretation of historical materialism. In 
any event, Labriola asserted that Marx was trying to press "idee gia 
vecchie" into the service of a new way of thinking. 21 Gentile, for his 
part, prefaced his translation of the Feuerbach Theses by quoting 
Engels' s disclaimer regarding the unfinished state of the Theses as he, 
Engels, found them. In so doing, Gentile only emphasized the Theses' 
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fragmentary nature, and their unreadiness for the publication that 
Marx himself apparently did not intend. 
Thus it is in light of the relatively unconsolidated character of 
historical materialism that we can read Gramsci's criticisms, in his 
prison notebooks, of the "marxisti ufficiali" who attempted to blend 
Marxism proper with elements drawn from non-Marxist 
philosophies. 22 While Gramsci agreed with Labriola's position that 
Marxism was itself an independent philosophy, he thought that its 
study and articulation would require the "massimo scrupolo di esat-
tezza" proper to a philosophy that had yet to be presented in a coher-
ent fashion. 23 
What is most remarkable about the filosofia della prassi, however, 
is the interpretive turn that it took from the beginning. Because of its 
focus on the synthesis of materialism and dialectic, the filosofia della 
prassi developed into a philosophy concerned with the concrete, 
dialectical grounding of knowledge. But in fact it is not too much to 
say that the Theses themselves are, if not a prolegomenon to a future 
hermeneutic, at least a prolegomenon in embryo. In essence, they raise 
the question regarding the proper grounding of human interpretation 
of the world. They do so, however, in a particular way . Because they 
look to a dialectical interpretation of the world, the question of the 
ground is presented as a series of problems manifested as instances of 
non-identity, or perhaps more accurately, as instances of identity not 
yet established. For example, we can find condensed presentations of 
the dialectical contradiction between part and whole (Theses IX and 
X); between universal and particular (Theses VI, VII, and IX);24 and 
between ideological mis-representation and the actual state of affairs 
obtaining (Theses IV and VII). 
But it is the posited inadequatio of thought to thing that provides 
a point of entry into the question of the ground. This is set out in the 
very first of the Theses. In Gentile's translation, it is formulated as a 
problem arising from a state of affairs in which "il termine del pen-
siero, la realta, il sensibile, e stato concepito soltanto sotta forma di 
oggetto o di intuizione." 25 This is to say that the thing is grasped 
through contemplation ("intuizione," which is Gentile's translation of 
"Anschauung"), and known under the description of an idea. Again, 
the problem is one that arises from a mode of contem~lation that nec-
essarily divides "gli oggetti sensibili dagl'intelligibili." 6 (Here, "intelli-
gibili" is Gentile's rendering of the original "Gedankenobjekten.") This 
is an old problem that can be posited in terms of a dichotomy between 
percept and concept, or between object and idea. It is not simply 
assumed that thought has missed-or perhaps has "overshot," as 
Adorno would have it later-its object, but that thought has founded 
itself on a kind of anti-object in the form of the concept. What the con-
cept represents can be characterized as an object correlate structured 
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like a set, the real-world extension of which is comprised of the objects 
whose membership is determined on the basis of a similarity and dif-
ference in relation to given features. This "intentional set" represents a 
type of knowledge-or better yet, a type of interpretation-in which a 
state of affairs is generalized, and superficially, at least, rendered inde-
pendent of situations of use or engaged activity. Thus as a quasi-inde-
pendent intelligible, the articulated concept presents the interpretation 
of the discrete elements of various experiences in terms of more or less 
decontextualized features understood as constants. 
If the question concerning the filosofia della prassi is whether and 
how "al pensiero umano pervenga la verita oggettiva"-to quote 
Gentile's translation of the beginning of the Second Thesis-the short 
answer is that contemplative thought, with its conceptualization, will 
not do. Superficially, the matter of the inadequacy of contemplative 
knowledge would seem to turn on the nature of the conceptual under-
standing produced by contemplation. Yet this is not so. The question is 
one of the ground, rather than the form or the content, of contempla-
tive understanding. 
The question of the ground becomes especially pressing in the 
context of a dialectic that is supposed to be materialist. If the end 
toward which dialectical movement leads and in which it culminates 
no longer is conceived of as a fully developed, self-rectifying world-
correlate-that is to say, as an Idea of the world-then the operative 
problem does not consist in the question: How is Thought totalized? 
but rather: On what ground does one bring thought and object into 
mutual agreement? Historical materialism's answer, as it is set out in 
the Second Thesis on Feuerbach, is that the grounding, or "proof," of 
thought is in praxis. 
By asserting that it is through purposive activity that we can 
bring thought back to things-or discover it there, as might also be 
asserted-the Feuerbach Theses suggest that objective knowledge is 
immanent in the world. We can interpret this in either of two ways. 
The first interpretation would propose an empirical adequatio of con-
cept to percept in which the concept would attempt to capture the 
autonomous movement of things. Here, nature would be thought of as 
moving dialectically in itself, and it would fall to thought to find itself 
immanent in such movement as a prerequisite to understanding that 
movement. Such a position is consistent within the framework of 
Engels' s dialectic of nature, and need not concern us here, at least inso-
far as the filosofia della prassi moves away from certain of Engels's 
tenets. For not only does Gramsci detach the filosofia della prassi from 
Engels, but he also establishes it along the lines of the second possible 
interpretation. Under his influence, the filosofia della prassi becomes a 
theory of meaning. 
When discussing electricity, for example, Gramsci writes that as a 
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natural force in itself, it certainly exists prior to its incorporation into 
human production. But to the extent that it exists only in itself, it is not 
historical,2 7 which is to say that it has not been incorporated into the 
context of human projects. In order to become part of history, electrici-
ty, and indeed anything that is purely in-itself, must function "come 
elemento di produzione dominato dall'uomo." 28 It must, in other 
words, be transformed from something that is in itself into something 
that is for-us: it must, in other words, be made meaningful. For mean-
ing is such only on a relational basis: it is a relational worth, or consti-
tuted value. In the context of the filosofia della prassi, the meaning of 
objects is in a sense the index of their being for us; that they are for us 
is therefore their truth. 
The meaningful object, as an object-for-us, is such by virtue of its 
human-constituted intelligibility: its truth in this sense comes to it 
through the specifically human dimension of intelligibility. Gramsci 
thus turns the philosophy sketched in the Feuerbach Theses into a the-
ory of truth qua meaning-fulness, and in effect denies the validity of 
attempts to grasp the object world in itself. His example of the histori-
cization of electricity bears this out. Before it exists for us in our pro-
jects, electricity is a fact, but as a purely natural fact that is in-itself, it is 
meaning-less. To say that it is meaning-less is to say that it has not 
been constituted as a worth in relation to our projects: its intelligibility 
has not been established on the basis of its being-for-us. 
It is important to note too that in regard to the filosofia della prassi, 
human being is the being on the basis of which objects are constituted 
as meaningful. Thus when Gramsci emphasizes the historical nature of 
the truth of the filosofia della prassi, he means that meaning comes into 
being through the agency of a historical subject in pursuit of its ends. 
Thus we see that meaning, as the humanized dimension of truth, is a 
specifically subjective dimension: it is truth for the historical subject. 
Once again, this is borne out in the status of meaning as a relational 
worth, or alternately, imputed value. It is through purposive, express-
ly human, activity that we can impute meaning to things, and thus 
conceive of reality subjectively, that is, as being for the subject in terms 
of that subject's engaged activity. The subject, as a historical actor, 
grounds meaning by virtue of its activity. 
With this emphasis on subjectively constituted meaning, the 
filosofia della prassi declines the pursuit of absolute truth. The adequatio 
of thought to thing is not to be grounded in the correspondence of 
thinking to things in themselves, but to the grasp of objects as being 
for us in the course of our activity. One can, of course, conduct dispas-
sionate investigation into natural phenomena, but from the perspec-
tive of the filosofia della prassi, the laws, hypotheses, and theories that 
comprise the scientific truths so derived are simply local truths con-
tained in the overall meaning of scientific activity as such. This mean-
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ing is grounded in the status of scientific activity as a purposive 
human activity, or praxis. In other words, scientific activity, by virtue 
of its making natural phenomena the objects of purposive action in the 
world, imparts a human dimension to those phenomena, and in so 
doing, makes them meaning-ful. Phenomena scientifically understood 
are understood through their human dimension-their being-for-us-
and thus the truths to be obtained from scientific inquiry are contained 
within the larger, human, truth of meaning-imparting activity in the 
world. 
For the filosofia della prassi, then, the solution to the problem of 
the ground of thought is not a matter of fact, but of grasping things as 
meaning-ful. If, from this perspective, there is a problem with concep-
tual thought, it is not due to its form or content. It is instead due to its 
forgetfulness of its ground in the human activity that gives rise to it, 
and in terms of which its truths are meaning-ful. It is forgetful, in 
other words, of its subjective constitution. 
But if we are to remain within the dialectical framework, with its 
posited opposition of subject and object mediated by a dynamic of 
negation and subsumption, we must restrict the understanding of 
meaning to a notion of instrumental worth, or value. As with any 
activity, of course, the environment broadly understood has an instru-
mental meaning for the engaged agent acting in it and on it. The envi-
ronment is a now enabling, now passive or resistant presence which 
must be modified or which must be made to accomodate modification. 
The instrumental nature of the environment's meaning derives from 
its constitution as a tool or site in relation to the agent's present pro-
ject, which is intended to have a certain effect on the environment. 
Within the framework of the dialectic, though, instrumentality arises 
as an outgrowth of a specifically ontological opposition arising from 
the fundamental and irreducible division of subject from object. The 
dialectic's ontological commitment is to the being of the subject and 
the being of the object, which can meet only subsequently on the field 
of meaning constituted by praxis. This meaning is a meaning-for-us, as 
we have seen. But the effect of this state of affairs is that instrumentali-
ty results from such dialectical grounding of meaning in the subject. 
The relation of opposition in which the rule of negation consists 
requires the subsumption of the object's resistance to the subject, and 
that subsumption will take the form of an instrumentality by virtue of 
which an approximation of the subsuming interest is attained. 
The Existential/Phenomenological Turn 
At this juncture, new problem comes up, and it is this: how do 
we ground the object-for-us in such a way that ontological alienation 
is eliminated? This is precisely the problem that Pietro Chiodi address-
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es in Sartre and Marxism.29 Although Chiodi's comments are not specif-
ically directed toward the filosofia della prassi-they are instead intend-
ed as a critical evaluation of Sartre's then-relatively new Critique de la 
raison dialectique30-they are particularly applicable to the similar, 
dialectical model of praxis inherited by the filosofia della prassi from its 
Hegelo-Marxist sources. It is worth remarking that Chiodi's critique of 
the ontology implicit in dialectics is an outgrowth of Italy's own 
school of positive existentialism-an existentialism that explicitly pre-
sented itself as a maturation of the "negative" existentialism exempli-
fied by Sartre's L'Etre et le neant.31 If this latter work could be seen as 
negative, it is because so much of the structure of its ontology is 
derived from Hegel, and particularly from master-slave dialectic. By 
the time of the Critique de la raison dialectique,32 the problem of alien-
ation is treated from a self-consciously dialectical perspective that 
focuses on the subjective reappropriation of the world. Sartre's book 
was intended as a correction of those dialectical approaches that 
neglect the role of the subject; in this respect, his work is comparable 
to that of the filosofia della prassi. Thus Chiodi' s remarks in regard to 
Sartre are in many respects of great interest to our discussion of the 
filosofia della prassi. 
Chiodi's criticism of the subjective dialectic is best summarized 
by his assertion that the Critique's explicitly Hegelianized existential-
ism embodies an alienation of subject and object that is "metaphysical, 
and thus ineliminable." 33 It is precisely the irreducibility of the onto-
logical categories of subject and object, and their basic relation of nega-
tion, that produces this alienation-an alienation, Chiodi asserts, that 
cannot be overcome, but can only be "suppressed." 34 What is especial-
ly problematic for Chiodi is the status of human subjectivity. Given the 
dialectic's implicit commitment to an ontology of alienation, Chiodi 
asserts, human subjectivity becomes the basis on which the "connex-
ions of objectivity" must be founded. 35 Such a relation, Chiodi states, 
must result in the subject's suppression of the object through interior-
ization of the object;36 once again, meaning as valorization comes at the 
price of an instrumentalizing subsumption. This problem is no less 
pressing for the filosofia della prassi, for it is one that arises out of the 
grounding of meaning in a transcendental subject. 
In his own meditation on the meaning and function of praxis, 
Enzo Paci continued along in the direction of the filosofia della prassi' s 
response to the problem concerning the grounding of cognition. This 
is a problem that Paci, as a direct descendent of Labriola as well as of 
Husserl, inevitably inherited. For Paci, the question of praxis comes 
down to a matter of dialectical reappropriation in which human being 
returns to itself in the meaning-content of its acts. Such reappropria-
tion both embodies and reveals the subjectivity that is the "meaning of 
historical truth." 37 The truth content of history, Paci implies, consists in 
112 DIFFERENT/A 
the subjective reappropriation of the totalizing processes of history, 
and this reappropriation is nothing less than the realization of the 
human meaning that derives from praxis' subjective dimension. With 
this emphasis on subjectivity, Paci explicitly acknowledges the influ-
ence of Labriola, who, Paci reminds us, spoke of human being as that 
which can act as "we," 38 which is to say as a self-presence acting under 
its own descriptions and cognitive of itself as doing so. In accordance 
with Labriola's position, Paci approvingly cites Gramsci's dictum that 
human being is the "active principle" of history, 39 producing itself 
even as it produces its milieu. 
Paci thus holds that the dialectic must traverse human subjectivi-
ty in order that rationality, as the directing force behind human inten-
tionality, be understood in its true nature as praxis. 40 What Paci is get-
ting at here-by way of the precedents provided by Labriola and 
Gramsci-is the need for praxis of any and every variety to carry a 
kind of self-awareness through which the engaged actor, regardless of 
the field of activity in which he or she is engaged, will be mindful of 
the status of that activity as having come into being in order to fulfill 
human needs, and as having been directed toward humanly-constitut-
ed ends. Notably, Paci interprets the Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach in light 
of the interpretive revelation afforded by the grasp of human inten-
tional activity in its self-awareness. In the Sixth Thesis, Marx takes 
Feuerbach to task for not having grasped human essence as concrete. 
Feuerbach' s failure, Paci suggests, is the outgrowth of his failure to 
conceive of human being as an historically-situated, practically-
intending being. It is because of this latter failure, Paci states, that 
Feuerbach conceived of human being as a purely natural phenome-
non. Instead, the essence of a situated, practically-intending being 
must be understood as Marx described it in the Tenth Thesis: socially. 
For his part, Paci defined the social essence of human being in terms of 
its telos: that is, as a movement and direction on the way to becoming 
fulfilled in the consciousness of history's unfolding. 41 It is precisely 
this telos that Paci thought separates human society from purely natur-
al aggregations and activities. 42 
The subjective reappropriation of history coincides with the 
unfolding revelation of history in its humanly-meaningful dimension. 
Reappropriation is in a sense a point of arrival that is just as much an 
arriving-toward as an arrived-at, which is to say that it is destining 
process as much as destination. Practically speaking, the process of 
reappropriation is embodied in the intentional actions and motivated 
behaviors that comprise the history that will be reappropriated . 
Accordingly, it is this behavioral aspect of meaning that Paci chooses 
to emphasize. This he does to the extent that he, in keeping with the 
tradition of the filosofia della prassi, understands the humanly meaning-
ful dimension of history as having arisen from the real and concrete 
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actions of situated agents acting in the world. 43 
Paci's emphasis on the behavioral simply results from his earlier 
emphasis on the status of human being as an active, history-producing 
agent. In a sense, Paci recasts the problem of the cognitive ground in 
behavioral terms, and pushes to the foreground a reworked dialectic 
of meaning-product and meaning-production. This dialectic does not 
posit as its motivating opposition a contradiction between an ideal 
form (or concept) and the object or object world it is meant to describe 
and explain, but instead involves an opposition between a meaning-
ful world-correlate as a product of human intentional activity, and the 
production of that world correlate in relation to goal-intending activi-
ty. Thus for Paci, the site on which this unfolding will take place, and 
in which it will be revealed, is the Lebenswelt, or network of historically 
contingent meanings in which any historical agent is situated. That 
these meanings are historically contingent only means that they are 
the products of human activity transpiring in time in a world made 
humanly meaningful by that activity. This is to say that the Lebenswelt, 
as the site of praxis, is the product of praxis as well. As such, the 
Lebenswelt, as a network of meanings, is a kind of supervenient artifact 
of human intentional behaviors. 
As with Gramsci, Paci is concerned only with the world for us. 
But Paci radicalizes this aspect of Gramsci's thinking. Here the key is 
in Paci's background in phenomenology, with its concept of the social 
aggregate understood as an interpreted environment of common 
meanings. For the Lebenswelt is nothing if not the aggregation of the 
world as it is interpreted for us and be-fore us. Thus Paci can further 
attentuate the pure and independent ontological claims of the object-
world by asserting that the network of meanings (in which we as situ-
ated, historical agents find ourselves) pre-exists-and in fact condi-
tions and constitutes-the ontological concepts through which we 
encounter the environment around us. 44 This attenuation is further 
supported by Paci's reformulation of the dialectical dyad in terms of 
subject and situation rather than in terms of subject and object as such. 
The object is no longer the object that simply stands against a subject, 
but is an object situated within an encompassing network in which its 
meaning structures it from within. With this radicalized conception of 
the world-for-us as a Lebenswelt, Paci effectively brackets out any ques-
tion of the need to reconcile the object world as such to an alienated, 
interpretive correlate . 
And yet alienation is not entirely banished from this dialectic. 
Indeed, the dialectic structure, even when applied to the way we exist 
the Lebenswelt, requires such alienation. The network of meanings, 
though produced by human activity-the Lebenswelt is, Paci reminds 
us, "formata da operazioni originarie" 45-stands as the site of the 
negation of the very human agency that made it. In terms of content, 
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Paci suggests that the Lebenswelt is experienced as need, the meaning 
of which is human lack embodied as necessity. Structurally, though, 
the relation between human being and its surrounding network of 
meanings must be posited as being one of negation as well. At a fun-
damental level, we might say that if the meaning of the world is 
embodied as lack, it is because the world as meaning has been alienat-
ed from the agents that produced and continue to produce it. They 
cannot recognize it as their own. Thus this network of meanings is 
experienced only as exteriority; the relation between human being and 
human meaning, as aggregated in the Lebenswelt, is one of subject and 
objectified subjectivity . Considered dialectically, the Lebenswelt func-
tions as the externalized signification of human agency: whether these 
significations originate in the activity of a single subject or a macro-
subject (such as, for instance, "i gruppi e i nuclei intersoggettivi"), 46 
they stand outside of and against the producing subject as the subject's 
alienated meaning. That the Lebenswelt is prior to any particular actor 
only reinforces its status as an alienated object: it is as if the _actor must 
come to a body of preconstituted meanings into which creative entry 
is forbidden. This negation reaches forward from the past to reinforce 
the quasi-ontological alienation of human being from the meanings it 
has called into being in its activity, and it is only at some point in the 
future, through the decisive break of the dialectical Aufhebung, that 
those meanings can be reappropriated. 
From the inevitability of this prior alienation arises the specific 
profile of Pad's concept of the telos of dialectical reappropriation. If the 
alienated Lebenswelt is (mis)recognized only as an exteriority, overcom-
ing this misrecognition is the purpose toward which history must 
move. The reappropriation of the Lebenswelt is precisely the recovery 
of alienated meaning by the dis-covery of the human dimension that 
forms and informs the Lebenswelt to begin with. Human being must 
reveal the Lebenswelt as humanly meaning-ful, and thus negate the 
negation of itself by its alienated product; thus accomplished, histori-
cal alienation would be canceled and overcome, and subsequent histo-
ry established on a higher plane. The truth content of history would be 
simultaneously revealed and established by the Aufhebung of negation 
in exteriority. That, for Paci, is the overriding goal of praxis: its auto-
recovery as the ground and developing producing force behind mean-
ing. 
For Paci, then, the dialectic of praxis is recast as a dialectic of 
interpretative dis-covery, with an emphasis on the reappropriation of 
meaning as revelatory moment of truth. Pad's ownfilosofia della prassi 
can thus be understood to have taken a pronounced turn toward 
hermeneutics. Within this dialectical hermeneutic, praxis functions as 
the engine driving the emerging coming-into-awareness of situation as 
humanly meaningful. Interpretation itself qualifies as a kind of praxis, 
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of course, since it is a directed activity developing in the service of a 
specific telos. Thus the dialectic of interpretation is embodied as a goal-
directed behavior intended toward the reconciliation of subject and 
situation as sharing a community of being brought into being by the 
humanized truth of meaningfulness. Praxis, as the futural movement 
and direction of human activity, reveals the meaningfulness of situa-
tion as it plays out its part as the "active principle" of history. Pad's 
dialectical phenomenology thus further elaborates the interpretive ten-
dency of the filosofia della prassi by focusing attention on the situation-
al, interpretive, constitutively prior basis of meaning. In effect, Pad's 
insistence is on the status of the product of praxis not only as mean-
ingful, that is, as having a worth arising in relation to the active 
human modification of the environment, but as a developing interpre-
tation immanent in activity and making itself (increasingly) present to 
activity as well. 
The Weak Turn 
The developing self-presentation of the basis of interpretation, 
however, can only be realized at the price of the refusal of the dialecti-
cal negation and Aufhebung. Certainly, this is an at least paradoxical 
contention in regard to a dialectical philosophy. But such is the view of 
Vattimo, and it is worth examining as the logical outcome of the 
impasse at which a dialectics of negation arrives. Vattimo fully recog-
nizes his own position as an inheritor of the dialectical tradition; what 
I would like to do is show how this position of inheritance is realized 
in Vattimo's attraction to the notion of Verwindung. For it is through 
Verwindung that we can see an effective turn from the understanding 
of history as a futurally postponed telic reaching, to the imagining of 
interpretation as a historico-cumulative tradition. This, as we will see, 
entails the substitution of method for praxis as the organizing constant 
of the interpretive equation. 
Although Vattimo borrows the term Verwindung from Heidegger, 
as an explicitly central concept it is more important to Vattimo than to 
Heidegger. To judge from the infrequency of its occurrence and the 
lack of overt attention and elaboration given it, Verwindung is a minor 
element in Heidegger's vocabulary. With Vattimo, things are quite dif-
ferent. Not only does Verwindung occur more often in Vattimo's writ-
ings than in Heidegger's, but Vattimo explicitly meditates on the pos-
sible meanings, nuances, and implications of Verwindung and the 
relation it signifies. As we will see, this relation provides the conceptu-
al matrix within which to situate Vattimo' s thought vis-a-vis twentieth 
century metaphysics-and particularly dialectics. 47 I therefore feel that 
it is appropriate to discuss as Vattimo's own the content of 
Verwindung-at least to the extent that Vattimo has come to articulate 
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it. 
Vattimo's reading of Verwindung, perhaps best stated in an article 
entitled "Verwindung: Nihilism and the Postmodern in Philosophy," 48 
is multifaceted. The basic meaning of the word, however, is fairly sim-
ple. Verwindung means "distortion," while the verb verwinden means 
"twist," or "to get over." Verwindung is predominantly employed as a 
technical term in the context of engineering, its sense being that of a 
warping or torsion of material. On a more figurative-but still rela-
tively fundamental-level, Verwindung yields "transformation," or 
more generally, a change of state. Vattimo derives this m~aning from 
the evidence of Verwindung's occurrence in Heidegger's Uberwindung 
der Metaphysik, but both noun and verb function in similar conceptual 
roles in Identitiit und Differenz and "Der Spruch des Anaximander." 49 
The English translators of these latter two works give Verwindung as 
"surmounting" and "transformation," respectively, while the transla-
tion of verwinden in Identitiit und Differenz is "turn." 50 But what inter-
ests Vattimo the most about Verwindung is the sense, extrapolated from 
verwinden, of surpassing and/ or recovery (in the sense of recoverinB 
from an illness) and more important still, an accepting resignation. 
This deeper implication of acceptance derives not only from Vattimo's 
reading of the contexts in which Heidegger sets the term, but from its 
other nuances, particularly those regarding health. 
Verwindung, like Aufhebung, is a term describing a relation to an 
antecedent state or condition. Also like Aufhebung, the state arising 
from the antecedent state is a changed state in which something of the 
previous state is preserved. It is interesting to note that while Vattimo 
likes to emphasize Verwindung as a convalescent recovery, his use car-
ries the force of recovery as a gathering in or salvaging of a thing that 
is attenuated or broken. Thus if Verwindung is a transformation, it is 
one that conserves as it transforms, while nonetheless managing to 
distort that which it transforms. (What comes to mind here is another 
colloquial meaning of verwinden, which is "to get the better of.") Yet 
the temporal outlooks implicit in the two concepts vary enormously. It 
is not simply that Verwindung demands a certain attentiveness to the 
past-although this it does, as Vattimo is quick to assert. 52 It is that 
Verwindung, unlike Aufhebung, temporalizes on the basis of the past 
rather than on the basis of a future that has yet to be. This difference in 
temporal constitution becomes especially obvious when we contrast 
the interpretive stance of Vattimo's Verwindung to that of Paci's dialec-
tic. 
By definition-and by explicit formulation as well-Paci's dialec-
tic of interpretation reaches toward a state of resolution postponed 
until some moment in the future. The reconciliation of subject and sit-
uation in the recovery of meaning is something that is to come; its 
attainment signifies the end of history not only in that it terminates 
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history as a kind of obscure groping toward concealed meaning, but 
also in that it provides the goal toward which history's groping reach-
es. It is break and completion, destining and destination, all at once. 
The moment of revelation is at the same time the moment of 
Aufhebung: of the cancellation of the past and its internal negations, 
and the establishment of the point of rest and completion at a higher 
level. Yet the future as the site of reconciliation represents not so much 
the fulfillment of hope as it does an index of the alienation of the pre-
sent. The dialectic's redemptive eschatology has been let out to play in 
the field of meaning. In effect, one looks to the future to provide the 
dis-covery of that which already is, and in terms of which the future 
itself is intelligible (as, it must be added, is the past). 
Under the terms of Vattimo's Verwindung, the site of the source of 
the dis-covery of meaning moves from a more or less distant and as 
yet ungiven future, and back to a past that, on the contrary, is indeed 
given. By moving the site of the source of dis-covery from future to 
past, the weak hermeneutic eliminates the structural need for a recon-
ciliation that would in turn surmount and harmonize conflicting 
antecedent elements. The antithetical relationship itself is substantially 
reconfigured as a second order phenomenon arising from a prior intel-
ligibility. It is no longer a matter of an after-the-fact reconciliation 
establishing a common footing for negatively related (and irreducible) 
modes of being, but rather of a recovery of the prior constitution of the 
meaning-fulness of those modes of being. Accordingly, the temporal 
structure of the weak hermeneutic is proleptic, in that it brings for-
ward into present concerns the prior background of the given set of 
behavioral/interpretive dispositions, beliefs, and narratives. It is this 
given that comprises the content of tradition. With its commitment to 
a proleptic temporalization, the weak hermeneutic can claim to replace 
the eschatology of the dialectic with the recovery of tradition. 
Coda 
If we consider the completion of a tradition to arrive with its 
articulation and administration, then Vattimo's weak hermeneutic 
effectively completes that of the filosofia della prassi's dialectical philos-
ophy. This it does by providing the filosfia della prassi with a meta-
narrative. For if the coherence of a tradition is afforded by the higher-
order discourses-the narratives-that comprise and characterize it, 
its tending and management come in the form of a meta-narrative. 
(Here, I am using "narrative" to mean an ordered representation of 
articulated practices and problems characteristic of and defining a 
practical field or tradition.) This meta-narrative is a meta-narrative to 
the extent that it is a later, more highly articulated, and partly tran-
scendent narrative that takes as its object the procedures and habits 
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that give the tradition's narratives their peculiar collective profile. 
Thus to some extent, the administration of a tradition entails the elabo-
ration or codification of its background, albeit at a remove. For it is the 
function of a meta-narrative to articulate, that is, to investigate and 
bring to expression in a narrative of its own, the conditions of possibil-
ity implicit in the tradition's structures and instantiations. Such articu-
lation takes the form of an explication of the predominantly implicit 
rules and dispositions forming and informing the tradition in ques-
tion. To administer in this sense is to tend to or at-tend to in an atti-
tude of dis-covery. What is dis-covered are the habits of thought and 
the corresponding ontological outlook woven into the texture of the 
tradition's narratives. 
Yet at the same time, to tend to is in a sense to care for, or to serve 
(ad-ministrare), which is to say to be engaged with that which one 
approaches in an attitude of attention. (Not so curiously, perhaps, this 
shading of administration harmonizes with the nuance of Verwindung 
that particularly attracts Vattimo: that of the recovery from illness.) 
This should not be construed to mean that the administration of a tra-
dition ideally or necessarily remains subordinate to those prior narra-
tives now being administered. 53 In any event, we might remember that 
to administer to a patient is to serve that patient for the purpose of 
bringing about a change in state. Here, attending to and serving are 
prerequisites for transformation. 
This last observation holds as well for the hermeneutic meta-nar-
rative, which effects a shift in tradition by making explicit the tradi-
tion's historico-cumulative character, which is to say its status as a 
contingent accumulation of meanings couched in interpretive and nar-
rative structures. These meanings and structures project themselves 
forward as the set of problems that form the nucleus of the narrative's 
intersection with its practically-conceived environment. If, in effect, a 
tradition's narrative is the elaboration of the problems given in its 
environment, the meta-narrative is the articulation of the interpretive 
conditions that allow those problems to arise as they do, in the pecu-
liar forms that they take. By articulating those conditions, the formula-
tion of meta-narrative brings to a tradition the sense of denaturaliza-
tion proper to a second-order awareness of contingency. What in a 
tradition may once have seemed natural and of a timeless constitution 
admitting of no beginning or end no longer does, or even can.54 
The second-order perspective of hermeneutics presupposes its 
object to be a construction of interpretive conventions. This quite natu-
rally leads to a grasp of that object as a generative matrix of figures-
and it is with the figurative dimension of tradition that weak 
hermeneutics is particularly concerned. Thus in The End of Modernity, 
Vattimo discusses a phenomenon he describes as the fabulization of 
the world-a fabulization that simply is the other side of reification. 
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Such fabulization arises from the absorption into language ( or, more 
broadly, narrative) of our access to the world. 55 
It is here, in its consideration of modes of narrative as encom-
passing fabulized constructs of the world, that the weak hermeneutic 
recovers a key aspect of dialectics, and thus of the filosofia della prassi. 
For dialectics is nothing if not a fabulization of the world-a quasi-
mythic way of making intelligible the movement and works of purpo-
sive human behaviors directed toward alleviating need. The entire lan-
guage of contradiction and negation, which functions as both a 
subordinate and constitutive figuration relative to the crowning trope 
of Aufhebung, is itself an elaborate play of metaphor. This becomes 
apparent when we recall that dialectics characterizes all relations 
between entities as negation, when in fact those relations may span a 
range encompassing opposition (being positioned over against, 
though not necessarily in conflict), contemporaneous coexistence, tem-
poral succession, sequential development, and of course, outright con-
flict. This list does not exhaust the possibilities of relations between 
relata, but does show that universally posited negation, as a kind of 
figurative transposition of the law of the excluded middle, not only 
reduces relata to two (negatively) opposing modes of being, but also 
reduces the range of possible relations between relata to a struggle 
ending in mutual annihilation and transposition to a purportedly 
higher state. The ontological reductiveness of this figurative adapta-
tion of the language of logic is only underscored by the complex trope 
of Aufhebung, which is to say by the so-called negation of the negation, 
which brings on the supercession of irreducible elements by the higher 
state that cancels them. 
With the substitution of Verwindung for Aufhebung, weak thought 
simply underlines the organizing role of the latter concept. For the fig-
urative constitution of dialectics turns on the weighted metaphor of 
Aufhebung. This concept-itself highly figurative-carries the norma-
tive force needed to make the dialectical triad cohere. Indeed, as the 
third term of the triad, it is the triad's coherence in an essential way. 
Vattimo himself has remarked on the normative coherence that 
Aufhebung brings to dialectics. 56 The need for a specifically normative 
coherence becomes particularly apparent when we consider the escha-
tological constitution of the dialectical triad. 
The underpinnings of the weak hermeneutic, of course, are no 
less figurative than are those of dialectics. The difference lies in the 
weak hermeneutic' s apprehension of itself as figurative, and beyond 
that, as having been given its specifically figurative shape on the basis 
of its position as administrator of a particular metaphysical inheri-
tance. Vattimo himself has acknowledged that the weak hermeneutic 
is conceivable only if one assumes the dialectical inheritance. 57 In fact 
it is weak thought's status as a meta-narrative that allows it not only to 
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substitute Verwindung for Aufhebung, but to convert the filosofia della 
prassi's concern with the subjective agency inherent in praxis into a 
preoccupation with the enabling conditions put into practice by 
method. 
From the perspective offered by the administrating meta-narra-
tive, method is not simply a procedure, but a complex of inter-
pretive/ interpreted skills and techniques that stands in relation to a 
particular way of being situated. This is so since method is bound up 
with the demands of the successful performance and integration of 
competent activity, and therefore presupposes a certain horizon or 
multiple horizons of usage that constitute a given way of proceeding 
with which method, in order to be valid, must be in accordance. 
Method is not simply a way of doing things; it is a way of doing things 
in an established manner, or in relation to an established manner, since 
it is through method that channels of transmission are kept open in 
their characteristic ways. 
To say that method is a way of doing things in relation to an 
established manner is to emphasize the largely improvisational nature 
of procedural repetition and reproduction. To some extent, this kind of 
methodological improvisation-which always takes place within lim-
its-provides the conditions of possibility out of which meta-narrative 
can arise in the first place. Method thus implies a degree of conven-
tionalism-not in the sense that it is formed and therefore restricted by 
a kind of circumscription by consensus, but in the sense of an interpre-
tation of an ethos that frequently is not brought to complete expres-
sion at the level of explicit reflection, theorization, and commentary. 58 
Here I would like to assert that interpretation by no means is lim-
ited to, or even primarily, a phenomenon dependent on language, or 
even the occurrence of conceptual or intentional-semantic contents. 59 
By the time one's access to the world has been absorbed into language, 
one already has embodied and lived it in terms of one's knowing how 
to get by in an environment one's competent actions reveal as intelligi-
ble. There is here an executive competence "known" as a presence to 
self as an assured, self-referential causality independent of the explicit 
regulation to be had in terms of occurrent content states. One frequent-
ly employs method without necessarily being aware of the fact: like 
the network of meanings in which we inevitably are situated, method 
often is conspicuous by its seeming transparency. For in fact one is in a 
field already knowing how to function within it, whether or not one 
has explicitly articulated one's place, or indeed, the content of the field 
in which one finds oneself. And it is through such behaviors, embod-
ied in method, that one identifies oneself as being within an interpre-
tive matrix, or tradition. 
Thus method, properly conceived, turns on the notion of an 
agent's being situated in a preexisting field constituted by prior mean-
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ings. And it is here that the character of method deviates from that of 
praxis. For method precedes praxis, and provides the actions that com-
prise praxis a basis in skillful manipulation. Method is an accumulated 
inheritance made immediately useful. Even so, as a kind of re-situated, 
de-subjectified praxis, method recovers something of the original 
meaning of praxis as a guiding knowledge. 
If anything, it is the task of meta-narrative to reflect on the meth-
ods it finds ready for use-even as it is guided by them. Method is not 
only the tool that meta-narrative finds ready for use and accordingly 
employs, it is also the object of its reflection. With this reflection it nat-
urally follows that the role of the subject as originator of activity will 
be re-imagined. Rather than being creator and constitutor, the subject 
instead will be envisioned as having been constituted by the meanings 
available to it, which well up in the guise of the descriptions under 
which its activity can be undertaken, and indeed even imagined. To 
whatever extent a subject can be an originator, it must also be an 
executor. If the filosofia della prassi pushed the role of the subject to the 
foreground, the meta-narrative of the weak hermeneutic draws our 
attention to the background: that is, to the situatedness of the subject, 
apart from which it (literally) would make no sense, and its activities 
would have no meaning. If praxis is the pursuit of subjectively posited 
goals, method is what allows such goals to be posited in the first place. 
Emphasis on the interpretive background notwithstanding, 
meaning does not lose its character as a relational worth. It is true, 
however, that meaning must be rethought as being in relation not to a 
subject as an autonomous ground of action, but rather to the subject's 
environment, which provides the interpretive-interpreted background 
without which subject and object could not even emerge. 
With praxis seen against the background of method, the interpre-
tive project begun with the Theses on Feuerbach comes full circle. 
Praxis is brought back beyond the filosofia della prassi, to Aristotle: for 
method is the guiding understanding that directs action, and the weak 
hermeneutic is the meta-narrative that articulates it. The relation of the 
subject to the environment is mirrored in the relation of praxis to 
method, and the search for the subjective ground of knowledge takes 
us instead to the background. 
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